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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe Case. 
This is an appeal from the denial ofa  motion to set aside ail order dismissing a petition 
for post-conviction reliei: Clerk's Record (CR) 163. 
B. Procedural Historv and Statement of Facts. 
On January 3 1, 2002, Appellant Daniel Eby filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 
relief after a direct appeal resulted in a grant of partial relief. CR 14, State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 
536,37 P.3d 625,627 (2001). 
Daniel had been convicted of first degree murder, coilspiracy to commit robbery and 
attempted robbery for offenses occurring when he was 18 years old. In the direct appeal, the 
Court of Appeals'held that his statement to the police, "I've got an attorney" did not invoke his 
right to counsel so as to require termination of his interrogation, that the admissioil of hearsay 
statements by a co-defendant who did not testify at trial was error, but that the error was 
harmless, that a threats and menaces jury instruction was not warranted, and that the conviction 
for attempted robbery merged with the conviction for felony murder. Id. 
Daniel raised two issues in his pro se petition: 1) that he had received ineffective 
assistance of counsel; and 2) that the prosecutor andlor state had withheld favorable information 
from the defense. CR 15. 
Daniel filed a motion for appointment of counsel concurrently with his petition. CR 28. 
And, on the same day, the District Court appointed the Kootenai County Public Defender to the 
case. CR 31. 
The state filed its answer to the pro se petition asserting that it failed to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. CR 35. And, four days later, on February 11,2002, a notice of 
substitution of counsel was filed giving notice that the case had now been assigned to conflict 
counsel Jeffery Smith. CR 37. 
On June 27, 2002, Daniel wrote to the District Court stating that Smith had oilly spoken 
with him once and would not accept his phone calls or answer his letters. Daniel said that he still 
had not been informed as to whether a court date had been set on his petition and he wondered if 
there was a motion or "any type of paper" he could file to get an attorney to actually help him and 
keep him informed of the status of the case. He also asked the Court to please let him know if a 
court date had been set or if anything else had happened in the case. Ex. Letter dated 6127102.' 
h response the Court wrote back saying that it understood that new counsel was being 
assigned and that the judge would review the case in another 30 days to be sure that Daniel's 
concerns were being addressed. Ex. Letter dated 7/12!02.2 
On August 12,2002, six months after Smith had been appointed, the District Court issued 
its first Notice of Proposed Dismissal pursuant to Idaho Civil Rule of Procedure 40(c) giving 
Daniel until August 29,2002, to file a written affidavit setting forth facts to justify retention of 
the case. A handwritten note on the bottom of the notice says that per John Adams, new counsel 
was to be forthcoming and that the case would not be dismissed. CR 39. 
On September 1,2002, Daniel again wrote to the Court saying that he still had not heard 
I A packet entitled "Exhibits Letters between Plaintiff and Judge Luster & Public 
Defender" is included in the record on appeal. Because the packet contains no page numbers, the 
letters will be cited here by date. 
Later, the District Court stated, ". . . Mr. Sinith basically didn't do anything in the case, 
and I think he had some probleins with the Bar Association." Tr. 19. 
if he had been appointed new counsel and was wondering what was happening in the case. Ex. 
Letter 9/1/02. On September 10, 2002, the Court wrote back to Daniel and stated that there had 
been a delay in his representation but current arrangements were under way to obtain qualified 
counsel and aslted Daniel to contact the Court again in 30 days if he still had not been contacted 
by counsel. Ex. Letters 911 0102. 
On October 8,2002, with no notice of appearance by any new counsel having been filed, 
the state filed its motion for summary judgment. The state's motion simply stated that it sought 
summary judgment because "Petitioner has not alleged or shown any prejudice and mere 
allegations are insufficient for proper Post Conviction filing." CR 41. 
On October 11,2002, Daniel wrote to the Court again saying that he still had not been 
contacted by counsel. Ex. Letters 10111102. The Court responded with a letter telling Daniel that 
Rolf Kehne had been appointed. Ex. Letters 10128102. And, on October 21,2002, Kehne filed a 
notice of appearance. CR 42. 
For the next six months, nothi~lg was filed in the case. Then on April 30, 2003, the Court 
filed a second notice of a proposed dismissal for inactivity under Civil Rule 40(c) giving Kehne 
until May 19, 2003, to file an affidavit setting forth specific facts to justify retention of the case. 
However, this notice was incorrectly addressed and apparently was not delivered to Kelme. CR 
46. 
On May 27, 2003, a third notice of proposed dismissal under Rule 40(c) was issued 
giving Kehne until June 16, 2003, to submit an affidavit justifying retention. CR 48. And, this 
time, on June 16,2003, Kehne filed a response setting out work he had already done on the case 
and proposing a timetable for the remaining work including his intent to file an amended petition 
by September 15, 2003, and dispositive motions by October 15,2003. CR 49. Two days later, 
the Court issued its order retaining the case. CR 59 
On December l I ,  2003, Daniel wrote to ICehne: 
Jin writing to see what the status of my case is and if any court dates have been set 
yet. 
I was also wondering iT(208) 939-2023 is the only number I can try to call you 
collect at? The reason I'm asking is because I've been trying to reach you at that 
number for about 40r5 months during business hours with no luck. 
Could you please write and let me know how the case is going and if any court 
dates have been set. 
Thank you for your time. 
CR 114 (errors in original). 
The record contains no indication of any response to this letter. 
The dates for action set out in Kehne's prior response to the notice of proposed dismissal 
came and went with nothing being filed in the District Court. And, 011 December 15, 2003, three 
months after the date upon which Kehne bad stated he would file an amended petition, the Court 
issued its fourth notice of proposed dismissal for inactivity. CR 60. 
On Ja~~uary  2,2004, Kehne filed a response and affidavit in which he stated, "Owing to 
the press of other cases, Petitioner's counsel bas not been able to keep the schedule proposed in 
the June, 2003, RESPONSE." Kehne set out the work he had completed in the prior six months 
and set out a new proposed timetable which included filing an amended petition on March 15, 
2004. CR 62. 
Again, the Court retained the case. CR 71 
By July 12,2004, Kehne still had not filed anything in the case and the District Court 
issued its fifth notice of proposed dismissal for inactivity. CR 72. Kehne responded stating, 
"Petitioner has largely completed his review, investigation, research and analysis of post- 
conviction issues, and can file an amended petition shortly." He proposed filing the amended 
petition on October 4, 2004. CR 74. 
In the response, Kehne outlined the issues he intended to raise in the amended petition. 
These included a claim that trial counsel had been operating under a conflict of interest because 
they worked in the same office as counsel of a co-defendant; a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel at sentencing in failing to properly litigate the relative culpability of Danieland the co- 
defendants; and a claim that Daniel was entitled to resentencing as at the time of sentencing, the 
District Court did not have the Court of Appeals' liolding that the co-defendant's hearsay was 
inadmissible and that the conviction had to be treated as felony murder and not premeditated 
murder. CR 74. 
Again, the Court retained the case. CR 87. 
By February 8, 2005, nothing had been filed in the case. Now, seven months after the last 
order of retention and two years and four months after Kehne entered his notice of appearance, 
the District Court issued its sixth notice of proposed dismissal for inactivity. CR 89. 
Kehne filed a response stating that he had completed the interviews for his investigation 
and was "ready to file a Petition." All that was needed was for Kehne to take the petition to 
Daniel so that Daniel could sign it. Kehne stated that the amended petition would be filed on or 
before March 4, 2005, or he would file another declaration explaining the delay. CR 92. 
March 4,2005, anived and nothing was filed. And so, on June 14,2005, the District 
Court dismissed the case pursuant to the sixth notice of proposed dismissal filed on Februaly 3, 
Unfortunately, the order of dismissal was not served on Daniel. Rather, it was faxed to 
Kehne. CR 97.3 
It had now been three years and five months since counsel had been appointed to 
represent Daniel, yet no amended petition or any other substantive pleading had ever been filed. 
On August 9,2005, Daniel wrote to the Court: 
My name is Daniel Lee Eby #56649 I was wondering if you could tell me the 
Status of my Post-Conviction CASE No. Cv02-674 And if any kind of court dates 
or dead lines have been set in regards to my case. thank you for your time and 
help. 
Ex. Letter dated 819105 (errors in original) 
That same day, Daniel wrote to Icehne: 
This is Daniel Lee Eby #56540 Irn writing in reguards to my post-collviction and 
if any court dates or dead lines have been set reguarding my Post-Conviction? 
As of today's date I haven't been able to get in contact with you I tried to call your 
office (208) 939-2023 but that number has been disconnected. It gives you a new 
number. (208) 376 4006 but as of today I have been unable to get in contact with 
anybody or even an answering machine. 
Could you please get in contact with me some how so that I can find out the status 
of my Post-Conviction. thank you 
CR 11 8 (errors in original) 
Upon finally receiving notice that his case had been dismissed, Daniel wrote to the Court: 
On 8-17-2005 I received a letter back from the clerk of the court stating that my 
Post-Conviction was Dismissed on June-14-2005 
Three years later, on June 27, 2008, Rolf Kehne was suspended from the practice of law 
for one year with all but 90 days withheld based in part upon his coilduct in this case. After the 
90 day actual suspension, Kehne will be required to serve a two year probationary period. See 
Notice of Suspensioil/Public Censure, The Advocate, August 2008, pg. 9. 
Could you please check and see if Mr. Rolf Kehne has filed any kind of motions 
reguarding this matter, Like an Appeal or Motion for a rehearing? 
1 havc bccn unablc to get in contact with Mr. ICehne for the last couple of months 
and today is the first time that I find out that my Post-Conviction was Dismissed 
on 6-14-2005 I don't understand why I never received notice of this from the court 
house or my Attorney. 
Attached is a motion for a rehearing reguarding the Dismissal of my Post- 
Conviction Case # CV-2002-0674 And a Not~ce of Appeal reguarding the 
dismissal of said Post-Conviction. If Mr. Kehne has filed any of these said 
Motions could I please receive copies of them, If he has already filed these 
motions already please disreguard the ones I've enclosed. Thank You. 
Ex. Letter dated 8/17/05 (errors in original). 
Daniel's Notice of Appeal stated: 
Notice is hereby given that DANEL LEE EBY # 56540, Defendant in the above 
named case, appeals from the order of Dismissal of STATE Post-Conviction. 
Ex. Notice oCAppeal dated 8117105 
Daniel's Notice for rehearing stated: 
Notice is hereby given that DANIEL LEE EBY # 56540, Defendant is the above 
named case, Asks for a rehearing on the OIWER OF DISMISSALIRETENTION 
OF STATE POST-CONVICTION. 
Ex. Notice for Rehearing dated 8/17/05 (errors in original). 
Even though these documents were sent to the Court along with a certificate of service, 
they appear as exhibits on appeal and are not file stamped or entered into the Register of Actions. 
See Record on Appeal 
About two weeks later, on September 1,2005, Daniel wrote again to the Court: 
To: The Honerable Judge John Patrick Luster, 
I sent you a cot~ple of motions on 8-17-05 I was informed by another inmate that 
I've got to send that kid of stuff to the clerk of the court and that I also have to 
send a copy of thein to the State I was unaware of this, Could you please direguard 
the Notice of Appeal as I was informed that I need to file that at the end of all this. 
as of today I placed a copy of the NOTICE for a rehearing on order of 
Dismissal/Retention State Post-Conviction and a Copy of the AFFIDAVIT in 
support for the Motion for rehearing in the mail to the attorney general criminal 
division and a copy of these to the clerk of the court im sony for all these 
mistakes I just don't know what im doing when it comes to law. 
Is there any way that I could have a phone hearing reguarding this motion and get 
a hearing date and time so I can have a chance to prepare to the best of my ability 
with my lack of knowledge in the law. 
I thank you for your time. 
CR 98 (errors in original) 
This letter was followed five days later, on September 6, 2005, with a pro se notice for a 
rehearing on order of dismissal/retention and brief in support of review. In the briec Daniel 
stated that he was unaware of the pending dismissal of the post-conviction. He also set out 
specific claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and destruction of evidence by the 
investigating detective. At the end of his brief, Daniel asked for relief in the form of 1) 
assumption of jurisdiction; 2) reversal of the dismissal of the post conviction and remand for 
further proceedings; 3) grant of an evidentiary hearing; 4) remand for a new trial; 5) appointment 
of counsel; and 6) all other appropriate relief. CR 99, 108 
Daniel supported his briefwith an affidavit. In the affidavit, he stated: 
1. Rolf Kehne Never sent me notice that the court was going to dismiss my Post- 
Conviction for lack of inactivity. 
2. If I would of known the court was going to dismiss my Post-Conviction I 
would have opposed the dismissal. 
3. I spoke to Mr. Rolf Kehne around May 2005 and everything was fine with my 
Post-Conviction. 
4. Mr. Rolf Kelx~e's Conduct has denied me Due Process of law 
CR 107 (errors in original). 
On September 16, 2005, Daniel wrote to the clerk of the court asking about the status of 
his motion, brief, and affidavit. CR 110. 
Then, on October 3, 2005, Daniel filed a pro se motion for the appointment of new 
counsel. In the motion, Daniel cites Kehne's failure to communicate with him or work on the 
case and his own limited competence in representing himself. CR 11 1. Daniel attached copies of 
several letters he had sent to Kehne over the years in attempts to communicate with Kehne and to 
get Kehne to help him. CR 112-1 19. 
On November 17,2005, the Court appointed new counsel to represent Daniel. CR 120. 
And, on December 16,2005, Daniel wrote to the Court asking whether the Court could tell him 
the name of his new counsel as no one had yet contacted him. Ex. Letter dated 12/16/05. 
On January 17, 2006, Daniel wrote again lo the Court, again asking if the Court could tell 
him the name of his counsel because no one had yet contacted him. Ex. Letter dated 1/17/06. 
And, again, he wrote on February 9,2006, still having not been contacted by counsel. Daniel 
closed that letter: "I'm concerned about possibly being penalized for missing a dead line due to 
the fact I've yet to be contacted by counsel. Are there any dead lines I should be aware of? 1 
Thank You for Your Time." Ex. Letter dated 2/9/06. 
Finally, on March 7, 2006, a notice ofsubstitution of counsel was entered by Linda 
Payne. CR 121. And, on March 15,2006, Payne wrote to Daniel telling him that she planned to 
begin work on his case in April and that it would take "many, many hours to read and digest 
everything that went on in your case." Ex. Letter dated 3/15/06. 
On June 6, 2006, Daniel wrote again to the Court stating that he was worried about a 
letter be had received from Payne and asking if the Court could inform him as to what sort of 
time deadlines applied to his case. CR 125. In her letter to Daniel, Payne had written: 
The status of your case is in abeyance. There is no court date. I spoke with Judge 
Luster about your case approximately a month ago, and (since I have another 
murder trial upcoming with him) he is not pushing your case to hearing. He is 
giving me time to work on the current murder case and yours before he sets a 
hearing. 
When I get time I will read your file and give you an analysis. As I previously 
said, the strongest issue in your case is that your sentence is grossly 
disproportionate. I seriously doubt that you would get any less than 10 years. We 
have plcnty of time to adequately deal with your case. 
CR 126. (Daniel's concerns were quite justified as the status of his case was not "in abeyance" 
but rather dismissed at this time and as the question of whether a sentence is excessive is not one 
which can be successf~~lly raised in a post conviction proceeding.) 
On June 14, 2006, one year passed since the dismissal of the post-conviction petition and, 
presumably, Daniel's time to file a successive post-conviction petition expired." 
On July 26, 2006, Daniel wrote to Payne about his concerns: 
You were appointed to my Case over 4 months ago, Personally I feel my Case is 
being neglected, In your May-24-2006 letter you wrote and told me the status of 
my case was in Abeyance. 1 was not very pleased with that letter, My case was 
dismissed because of Rule 40(c) because of Mr. Kehne's lack of actived on my 
Case for 6 months. 
"ee Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 190, 177 P.3d 400,404 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(successive petition must be filed within a reasonable amount of time). 
Could you please write and tell me what is going on with my Case I feel like I'm 
being left in the dark and don't have a clue what is going on. 
. . .  
Ex. Letter dated 7/26/06 (errors in original). 
Payne responded by letter oil August 15,2006. She told Daniel that she had reviewed his 
files and detelmined that he had no basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and so 
had drafted an amended petition for his signature raising only the issue that his sentence was so 
excessive as to violate the Eighth Amendment. Payne acknowledged some problems with the 
petition, writing, "Technically, the Amended Petition is untimely; however, because your prior 
counsel failed to file any amendment, I believe Judge Luster will permit us to amend the petition, 
albeit late." She closed her letter by promising to contact Daniel when a hearing date was set so 
that he could appear by telephone. Ex. Letter dated 8/15/06. 
In a second letter a few days later, Payne explained why she refused to raise a claim of 
ineffective assistance of couilsel. I11 the letter, she stated among other things that ". . . you have 
the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that you would have been found not 
guilty if your lawyer(s) hadn't screwed up. In your case Gust like most defendants), you 
convicted yourself. . ." Ex. Letter dated 8/22/06 (emphasis original).' Payne also told Daniel 
that "[flor you to prevail on your ineffective assistance claims, you must show how you would 
have been fou11d not guilty if the favorable evidence from the police or prosecutor would have 
Contra Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88 (1984); (To establish prejudice, 
the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Proof by clear and convincing 
evidence is not required.). 
been pr~vided."~ And, then she instructed the indigent and imprisoned Daniel to investigate his 
ow11 claims, including a claim that trial counsel had operated under a conflict of interest telling 
him that he needed among other things "proof that Mr. Adams told your lawyers to do or not do 
something in your case to cause you to be found guilty." She concluded, "Unless you provide me 
with facts (not feelings or thoughts or accusations) that indicate there is some merit to your 
argument, I will not pursue ineffective assistance of counsel claims." Id. 
That same day, August 22, 2006, Payne filed an amended petition raising only the issue 
that Daniel's sentence (a fixed term of 25 years for first degree murder and 15 years for 
conspiracy to commit robbery) was so "grossly disproportionate, cruel and unusual" as to violate 
the Eighth Amendment. CR 127. 
Payne did file Daniel's pro se affidavit with the amended petition. In the affidavit, Daniel 
stated that it was his understanding that her petition would supplement but not replace his and 
that he still wanted to raise the issues that the government withheld favorable evidence and that 
he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. CR 129. She also included a second pro 
se affidavit in which Daniel stated that there was an actual conflict of interest because his counsel 
and a co-defendant's counsel worked in the same office and that in the preliminary hearing, a 
state's detective admitted to destroying a drawing and two or thee  pages of notes and that there 
' Contra Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963) (Suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment.); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995). (A 
showing of materiality under Brady "does not require demonstration by a preponderance that 
disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's 
acquittal." Id. "The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have 
received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, 
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id. 
may have been other evidence destroyed. CR 131 
Ln response to Payne's amended petition, the state filed a notice of objection and denial 
"based on the fact that this above captioned case has been dismissed per order of the court 
entered 6-14-05." CR 133 
Payne responded to this by filing a motion for summary disposition and amended notice 
of hearing. Payne did not mention the dismissed status of the case in her motion, rather, she 
argued that because Daniel was only an aider and abettor and not the person who actually 
performed murder, his sentence, which exceeded that of the co-defendants, violated the Eighth 
Amendment. CR 134. 
Throughout this period, Payne wrote several times to Daniel reassuring hiill that a hearing 
date was soon to be set or had been set in the case. She never mentioned that the case had long 
ago been dismissed. Ex. Letters dated 10/10/06, 12/21/06, 1/30/07,2116/07,2/28/07,3/26/07 
In the meantime, Payle became frustrated with Daniel. On April 3,2007, she wrote lo 
him: 
I am not required to do everything that you want me to do. I am required to work 
within the bounds of the law. 1 am doing so. 1 will not rehash what I have 
previously told you because you don't like the answer. 
I do not expect you to understand since you cannot understand that you are guilty 
of murder. You were foolish to take this matter to trial to begin with because you 
let the judge hear all of the evidence. A man was beaten to death with a baseball 
bat by your cohorts, and you did nothing to stop it. In fact, yon lured people away 
and kept them away so the robbery could be committed. This was a horrific 
crime. You helped hide the body. It is not my fault you were convicted of 
murder, nor is it my fault that you were given 25 years fixed. Thank your lucky 
stars you didn't get life without parole. 
The ONLY possible issue you have relates to the fixed portion of your sentence. 
Quite franltly, even if your fixed portion were to be reduced, you wouldn't make 
parole because you refuse to take responsibility for your actions. Grow up and 
stop whining. 
I'm moving to withdraw froin your case. You will receive a copy ofthe motion 
and notice. 
Ex. Lelter dated 4/3\07 (emphasis original). 
And, on April 9, 2007, l'ayne filed her motion to withdraw stating that the attorney-client 
relationship had been irreparably damaged and that Daniel lacked confidence in her so that she 
could no longer represent him. CR 146 
This same day, inexplicably, Payne apparently finally realized that Daniel's case had long 
ago been dismissed and decided to file, along with the motion to withdraw, a motion to set aside 
the dismissal pursuant to Civil Rule 40(c). The motion states: 
Prior counsel failed to show good cause for retention of this matter pursuant to 
IRCP 40(c). When counsel is appointed, the party represented has the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 905 P.2d 86 
(1995). Failure to diligently pursue a claim such that it is dismissed constitutes 
ineffective assistance of cou~~sel,  if the party is prejudiced by the dismissal. Id. In 
this case, Mr. Eby has a viable 8Ih amendment grossly disproportionate post 
conviction claim, though Mr. Eby and Ms. Payne disagree on the remainder of the 
original claims. Dismissal when a viable claim exists constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
If this matter remains dismissed, then Mr. Eby will file an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on prior post collviction counsel, and he will likely be appointed 
counsel to help him on that matter. 'The 81h amendment claim is a viable one, and 
it should be heard and decided by the Court. Judicial efficiency and economy 
constitute good cause and support setting aside the inactivity dismissal. 
CR 148. 
Payne never referred to the prior pro se documents Daniel long ago filed in an attempt to 
move the Court to reverse its order dismissing the case. 
Finally, on April 17, 2007, a hearing was held wherein Payne represented Daniel. Daniel 
was not present, but participated by telephone. Tr. 2. 
The Court elected to hear the motion to set aside the entry of dismissal and the motion for 
summary disposition prior to Payne's motion to withdraw. Tr. 3. 
In her opening statements on the motion, Payne first gave an inconect recitation of the 
procedural background of the case stating that there had been just two Rule 40 notices, that 
Kehne had responded to both, but that the Court had dismissed the case anyway. She then 
explained to the Court that it was only after she had filed the amended petition that she spoke 
with the prosecutor who explained to her that the case had long ago been dismissed. She then 
reiterated her argument that if this case is not reinstated Daniel can filed a new post conviction 
claiming ineffective assistance on the part of Kel~.ne, and so it would be most efficient to just 
reinstate this case because there is the viable Eighth Amendment claim. Tr. 4-6. 
When the Court questioned Payne regarding its authority to set aside the Rule 40 
dismissal, she referred to Rule 60, but made no immediate argument as to what the rule states or 
how it might apply to the case because she did not have her rule book with her. Tr. 7. 
The state argued that the Court was without jurisdiction to reinstate the case pursuant to 
Castle v. Hays, 131 Idaho 373,957 P.2d 351 (1998). The state asserted that under Castle, Daniel 
was limited to filing either an appeal within 42 days of dismissal or a motion to reconsider within 
14 days. Tr. 9. 
The state also pointed out that even if Daniel might have a valid claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel against Kehne, the time for filing any successive post conviction petition 
had long since passed. Tr. 12. 
Ln response, Payne, who had by now secured a copy of Rule 60, pointed out that under 
Rule 60 she needed to file a motion no later than one year after dismissal, but by her own 
calculations, she did not do so. "The motion that I filed was way past the one year point, Your 
Honor, so it seems to me that no matter how you look at it, I didn't file the paperwork timely." 
Next, Payne stated that since she was appointed in November 2005, she could have filed a timely 
Rule 60 motion within the first month of her appointment, but she failed to do so. She then 
offered that Castle should not apply to this case because it was a civil case and ". . .this isn't only 
a civil case, this is a criminal case where my client's liberty and freedom is at issue." Then, 
apparently ignoring the state's argument that any subsequent post conviction petition would be 
untimely, Payne argued that if the Court did not reinstate this case, Daniel would have to file an 
ineffective assistance of counsel on her ". . . and we'll go through this all again, which may be 
the absolute appropriate way to handle it." Tr. 14-15, 
The Court then adjourned for a short recess. When proceedings resumed, Payne finally 
alerted the Court that Daniel had filed his pro se pleadings seelting reinstatement of the case just 
a month and a half after the case was dismissed and that her pleadings were "really somewhat 
duplicative of that motion, and it was timely filed. We are within the six months or within the 
one year under Rule 60(b)." Tr. 16. 
The Court ultiinately denied the motion to set aside the entry of dismissal. CR 150. In so 
doing, the Court reviewed the procedural l~istory of the case. With reference to Daniel's timely 
pro se motion to set aside the dismissal, the Court stated: 
The Court could legally construe that what Mr. Eby filed was a Motion to 
Reconsider the court Rule 40(c) dismissal, back on the 16"' of September of 2005, 
based upon the Court's ruling on June 14Ih of 2005. 
Ti. 21. 
The Court then held that Castle does apply because post-conviction proceedings are 
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure and that pursuant to Castle relief from a Rule 40(c) 
dismissal is limited to a motion to reconsider filed within 14 days or a notice of appeal filed 
within 42 days. Tr. 21-22. With regard to Rule 60(b), the Court stated that it did not know if it 
was in a position to consider the application under that rule, but that even if it could, it had not 
received any satisfactory showing to justify setting aside the order of dismissal. Tr. 23. 
Wben Daniel pointed out that he did not get notice of the dismissal of his case until 
August 19, 2005, the Court said, " . . . I don't dispute that, and I recognize your plight there, but 
the Rules of Civil Procedure govern the proceeding and my clerk gave notice by fax to [Kebne] . 
. ." Tr. 25. 
This appeal timely followed. CR 154. 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in failing to set aside the order of dismissal? 
2. On rernand, should new competent counsel be appointed? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Failing to set Aside the Order of Dismissal 
Pursuant to Daniel's Pro Se Rule 60(b) Motion. 
The District Court denied the motion to set aside the order of dismissal because it 
believed that Castle v. Hays, supra, limited the means of seeking relief from a dismissal under 
lRCP 40(c) to only a motion for reconsideration under IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B) filed within 14 days of 
the order of dismissal or a notice of appeal filed within 42 days. The Court further found that 
even if Daniel's pro se motion to set aside the dismissal could be considered as a motion under 
IRCP 6O(b) for relief from a final judgment, that there had not been a satisfactory showing to 
support a grant of relief. 
This detennination was erroneous for two reasons. First, Castle does not limit relief in 
this case to only motions under IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B) or direct appeal. And, second, Daniel did 
make a satisfactory showing for a grant of relief under IRCP 60(b). 
Castle does not foreclose relief under IRCP 60(b) in this case because Castle did not 
consider the applicability of IRCP 6O(b) and does not hold that IRCP 60(b) is without meaning or 
effect when a case is dismissed under IRCP 40( c). 
In Castle, the case was dismissed pursuant to IRCP 40( c) and the plaintiff filed a 
"motion to reinstate" seventy-seven days later. The Castle opinion does not set out the reasons 
offered by plaintiffs to support reinstatement nor does the opinion give any indication as to which 
civil ~ u l e  plaintiffs relied upon in making the motion. 131 Idaho at 373-4, 957 P.2d at 352-353. 
Rather, the opinion states that relief from an IRCP 40(c) dismissal is limited and cites two 
avenues of relief, a motion to reconsider under IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B) and a direct appeal and holds 
that the motion to reinstate was not timely under either of these niles. The opinion does not state 
that IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B) and direct appeal are the only means of relief and the opinion does not 
state that IRCP 60(b) which governs motions for relief from a final judgment cannot be applied 
to IRCP 40(c) dismissals. In fact, the opinion does not even mention R C P  60(b) leaving open 
only the conclusion that the Court was not considering the application of that rule. 
Insofar as the District Court's refusal to set aside the dismissal in this case was premised 
OH a belief that Castle holds that relief from an IRCP 40( c) dismissal is not available under IRCP 
6O(b), it is erroneous and must be reversed. Daniel's pro se motion was a timely motion for 
relief from the final order dismissing his case under IRCP 60(b), and as will be d~scusscd below, 
his motioil was supported by sufficient reason and should have been granted. Therefore, he now 
asks this Court to reverse the District Court order denying him relief and remand the case with 
instructions to set aside the dismissal and appoint new competent counsel to represent him 
In the alternative, if Castle is read to prohibit motions under IRCP 60(b) after a case has 
been dismissed under IRCP 40(c), then Castle conflicts with the civil rules and should be 
overruled 
IRCP 40(c) provides: 
( c) Dismissal of Inactive Cases. In the absence of a showing of good cause for 
retention, any action, appeal or proceeding, except for guardianships, 
conservatorships, and probate proceedings, in which no action has been taken or 
in which the summons has not been issued and served, for a period of six (6) 
months shall be dismissed. Dismissal pursuant to this rule in the case of appeals 
shall be with prejudice and as to all other matters such dismissal shall be without 
prejudice. At least 14 days prior to such dismissal, the clerk shall give 
notification of the pending dismissal to all attorneys of record, and to any party 
appearing on that party's own behalf, in the action or proceeding subject to 
dismissal under this rule. 
Dismissal of a case is a final order. Marshall v. Enns, 39 Idaho 744,230 P.46 (1924), as 
cited in Castle v. Hays, 131 Idaho at 374, 957 P.2d at 352 
Rule GO(b) provides: 
(b) Mistakes, Inadvertence, Excusable Neglect, Newly Discovered Evidence, 
Fraud, Grounds for Relief From Judgment on Order. On motion and 
pursuant to such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: ( I )  mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, OK a prior judgment upon which it is based has beer1 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time, and for reasons (I), (2), and (3) not more than six (6) months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
Such motion does not require leave from the Supreme Court, or the district court, 
as the case may be, as though the judgment has been affirmed or settled upon 
appeal to that court. This rule does not limit the power of a court to: (I) entertain 
an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, or 
(ii) to set aside, as provided by law, within one (1) year after judgment was 
entered, a judgment obtained against a party who was not personally served with 
summons and complaint either in the state of Idaho or in any other jurisdiction, 
and who has failed to appear in said action, or (iii) to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. 
As the reader can see, Rule 60(b) is not limited by its terms so as to be inapplicable to 
orders of dismissal under Rule 40(c), and Rule 40(c) does not itself prohibit motions under Rule 
60(b). Any such limitation imposed by Castle is contrary to the rules as written and is not 
supported by any other case law 
Indeed; Castle includes another obvious error. Castle slates first that a11 order of 
dismissal under Rule 40(c) is a final judgment. Then it states, that a litigant may seek relief from 
a Rule 40(c) dismissal under IRCP l l(a)(2)(B). However, IRCP 11 (a)(2)(B) applies only to 
iilterlocutory orders and orders made after entry of the final judgment, hut not to final judgments. 
(B) Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of ally 
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before entry of 
final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final 
judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after 
entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of 
such order; provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of 
the trial court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 
57(e), 59.1,60(a), or 6O(b). 
IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). This rule, by its own language applies only to interlocutory 
orders and "any order of the trial court made after entry of final judgment." Thus, it does not 
apply to final orders dismissing cases. 
Castle contradicts the clear language of the rules insofar as it holds that relief from a final 
order dismissing a case may be obtained via a motion filed under IRCP 11(a)(2)(B) and may not 
he obtained via a motion filed under IRCP 60(b). This creates a nonsensical situation where 
litigants and attorneys wishing to contest orders of dismissal must violate the language of not just 
one, but two rules, IRCP 1 l and 60, in order to obtain relief from dismissal. If this Court is 
inclined to read Cnstle as precluding review of orders of dismissal under Rule 40(c), then Castle 
should now be overruled to avoid the confusing and absurd result of having case law directly 
contradict the clear language of the civil rules. See, State v. Bethvieser, 143 Idaho 482, 586, 149 
P.3d 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2006), stating that where the statutory language (in this case, the 
language of the civil rules) is unambiguous it must be given effect. 
In either event, whether this Court holds that Castle does not preclude Rule 60(b) motions 
and remains good law, or whether this Court holds that Castle does preclude Rule 60(b) motions 
and must be overruled, Daniel's pro se motion for relief from dismissal first sent to the trial court 
on the date he finally received word that his case had been dismissed, and then resent to the clerk 
of the court less than three weelcs later, was timely under Rule 60(b). 
In addressing the possibility that a timely Rule 60(b) motion had been made, the District 
Court stated that, even if Castle did not exist and it could consider a Rule 60(b) motion, it had 
not received a satisfactoly showing that it should set aside the dismissal. Even as the Court was 
making this statement, it acltnowledged that Daniel himself had been blameless in the situation 
leading to the dismissal of his case: 
The Court: 1 can ce~lainly pass on Mr. [Kelme's] representation here, that 
certainly may have been deficient and untimely, but I don't think that sympathy 
for Mr. Eby's plight really trumps the case holding or application under the Rules 
of Civil Procedure in this case. 
Daniel Eby: Your Honor, when you're talking about entering an order Notice of 
Dismissal of my case on August l G t h ,  2005, it was attached to my brief and I 
didn't know if it had been dismissed until 1 got notice froin the clerk of your court 
until August 19Ih, 2005. 
The Court: I made sure to made a record of that, Mr. Eby, and I don't dispute that, 
and I recognize your plight there, but the Rules of Civil Procedure govern the 
proceeding, and my clerk gave notice by fax to the attorney [ofl record on the day 
the dismissal was entered, and that was the 14"' of June, and that would be the 
controlling date of the notice. 
The fact that your attorney didn't notiEy you or you didn't get a copy of the 
proceedings until later, I don't think impacts the application of the rule under the 
circumstances, because I think it was Mr. [Kehne's] obligation to respond if he 
felt I should not have dismissed it because he needed to give me some more 
infonnation, he should have made that application within 14 days or simply filed 
an appeal after that point, and neither of those things occurred, and I have to run 
from those dates. 
The fact that you didn't [get] notice until later certainly creates some problems for 
you, but does not change the application for the rules, but I will make sure we 
made notice of that. 
Tr. 23-26. 
Earlier, the Court noted that Daniel's first appointed attorney had failed to work on his 
case, perhaps because the attorney had gotten into trouble with the Bar. Daniel's second attorney 
allowed the case to be dismissed for inaction through no wrong behavior on Daniel's part. In 
fact, the state Supreme Court finally suspended Kehne from the practice of law for a year based 
upon his actiou/inaction in this and other cases. And, finally, his third attorney's actions ill the 
case speak for theinselves. Payne, who could have filed a timely Rule 60(b) motion or 
successive post-conviction petition at the time of her appointment, could not even figure out that 
the case had been dismissed until she had been representing Daniel for 11 months and even then, 
because she could not figure out the case's status on her own, she had to have the prosecuting 
attollley explain it to her. She then sent Daniel personally abusive letters which, in addition, 
contained misinformation about what needed to be proved to establish Strickland and Brady 
claims. In short, Daniel had three different appointed attorneys and not one of them managed to 
meet his or her professional obligations by filing a timely amended petition or other available 
pleading. 
Daniel's post-conviction was dismissed for inactivity only because of the complete failure 
of appointed counsel to provide competent representation. This is a more than sufficient reason 
to justify relief from the dismissal. IRCP 60(b)(6). To hold otherwise would be to deny Daniel 
any sort of due process. Const. Art. I, S 13, U.S. Const. Amend. 5 and 14. "Due process 
demands an opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Gray v, 
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 182, 116 S.Ct. 2074,2090, 135 L.Ed.2d 457,482 (1996)." State v. 
Bettwieser, 143 Idaho at 588, 149 P.3d at 863. See also, McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 
729, 100 P.3d 621,623 (2004) ("The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the 
Idaho and United States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process he 
given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportullily to be heard."). 
Daniel's pro se motion for relief from the order dismissing his case was a timely motion 
under Rule 60(b). Relief should have been granted because, through no fault of his own, Daniel 
was denied due process by the repeat failures of appointed counsel to present his case to the 
District Court in a timely manner. For t h ~ s  reason, he asks this Court to reverse the order 
dismissing his case and to remand for appointment of new counsel and the filing, at last, of a 
proper and timely amended petition. 
B. Upon Remand, the District  oust Should be Ordered to Appoint New 
Comn~etent Counsel. 
Daniel is also requesting that upon remand this Coult specifically order that the District 
Court appoint new competent counsel to represent him. I.C. 5 19-4904 authorizes the 
appointment of counsel to represent indigent post-conviction relief applicants. And, while there 
is no constitutional right to an attorney in a state post-conviction proceeding so that a petitioner 
cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings, Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 
894,902, 908 P.2d 590, 595 (Ct. App. 1995), it seems obvious that the re-appointment of 
counsel who has been guilty of the gross deficie~~cies demonstrated by Payne would be a denial 
of Daniel's right to due process. With Payne in control of his representation, it is impossible to 
have any confidence that Daniel will be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Thus, given 
Payne's obvious antipathy toward Daniel and her lack of familiarity with basic precepts of 
constitutional law and post-conviction procedure, different counsel should be appointed upon 
remand. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Daniel requests that this Court reverse the order denying 
his motion for relief from the order dismissing his case and further reverse the order dismissing 
the case. He also requests that this Court order the District Court to appoint new counsel upon 
was denied due process by the repeat failures of appointed counsel to present his case to the 
District Court in a timely manner. For this reason, he asks this Court to reverse the order 
dismissing his case and to remand for appointment of new co&sel and the filing, at last, of a 
proper and timely amendedpetition. 
B. Upon Remand, the District Court Should be Ordered to Avpoint New 
Competent Counsel. 
Daniel is also requesting that upon remand this Court specifically order that the District 
Court appoint new competent counsel lo represent him. I.C. 5 19-4904 authorizes the 
appointment of counsel to represent indigent post-conviction relief applicants. And, while there 
is no constitutional right to an attorney in a state post-conviction proceeding so that a petitioner 
cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings, Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 
894, 902,908 P.2d 590, 595 (Ct. App. 1995), it seems obvious that the re-appointment of 
counsel who has been guilty of the gross deficiencies demonstrated by Payne would be a denial 
ofDaniel's right to due process. With Payne in control of his representation, it is impossible to 
have any confidence that Daniel will be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Thus, given 
Payne's obvious antipathy toward Daniel and her lack of familiarity with basic precepts of 
constitutional law and post-conviction procedure, different counsel should be appointed upon 
remand. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Daniel requests that this Court reverse the order denying 
his motion for relief from the order dismissing his case and further reverse the order dismissing 
the case. He also requests that this Court order the District Court to appoint new coui~sel upon 
remand so that new competent counsel can finally file an amended petition as appropriate 
F Respectfully submitted t h e -  day of September, 2008. 
d. - 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney fo; Daniel Eby 
CERTFICATE OF SERVICE 
r? 
I, Dennis Renjzjarnin, hereby do certlfy that on this%- day of September, 2008, I 
deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the above 
brief addressed to: Office ofthe Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010. 
7-'bflh%VdjG- Dennis Benjamin 
